A) Mostly a political agenda;

B) Lack of co-ordination with private initiative;

C) Devised partly as a result of the frustrations arising of the Uruguay Round of the Gatt;A) Signed in 1991;

B) Objectives:

i) Free circulation of capital, goods, services and people;

ii) The creation of a common external tariff and trade policy;

iii) The co-ordination of macro-economic policies.A) Macro-economic fragility in the main member-states;

B) Exchange controls in Brazil;

C) Currency board in Argentina;

D) Argentina´s high economic price for the half-hearted acceptance of Brazil´s political regional leadership;

E) Economic distortions and induced diversion of investments;

D) Lack of a credible system of dispute resolution.A) Regional trade went from US$ 5 Billion in 1991 to US$ 10 Billion IN 1993, US$ 14 Billion in 1995, US$ 20 Billion in 1997 and again in 1998;

B) Note that 59% of internal trade is of agricultural commodities and products, sugar excluded;

C) Note that 50% of Argentina´s exports of manufactured goods were sent to Brazil, leveraged by the over valuation of the Brazilian currency by the Real plan;

D) Note that 35% of Argentina´s exports were directed to Brazil;

E) The establishment of a common external tariff, albeit with many exceptions, such as the automotive sector, information technology, sugar, etc.A) The foundering of the Real plan and the devaluation of the Brazilian currency;

B) The Argentine reaction and Resolution 911, which established quotas for imports applied to all trade partners, including Brazil;

C) The Brazilian counter-reaction, the loss of diplomatic dialogue, the burden on diplomatic relations caused by the inadequacies of the dispute resolution system;

D) Sectors affected: milk; shoes; steel; poultry; pigs; automobiles; paper and pulp; textile; sugar; capital goods;

E) Managed trade substituted free trade;A) New administration in Argentina will facilitade diplomatic dialogue, without major changes in policy;

B) Member-states will agree to disagree;

C) The political agenda for Mercosul will persist;

D) The success of free trade, and of the block, will depend on the macro-economic conditions prevalent in Brazil;

E) Whilst no major success is achieved internally in Brazil, Mercosul will not be subject to pro-active changes and will remain an exercise of managed trade within a context of basic political good-will; and

F) The possible consequences of a failure of multilateral liberalisation within the WTO and of the impact of the eventual success of the FTAA initiative.